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Impairment Recognition and Revaluation– China Publicly Listed Companies
Introduction
The advent of SFAS 142 and IAS 36 regarding handling of asset impairment has spawned research
into how these standards influence whether an impairment loss is recorded. Deferred tax items in
China have three major components: temporary tax and financial reporting differences in
depreciation; impairment losses; and previous losses, which can be carried forward for five years
for tax purposes. While the temporary differences in depreciation typically defer taxes and create
deferred tax liabilities, impairment losses and previous losses create deferred tax assets because
they are not deductible in the current period for tax purposes. A deferred tax asset is created when
a firm has overpaid its taxes and is due some form of tax relief sometime in the future when the
previously non-deductible loss becomes deductible for tax purposes. A deferred tax asset is viewed
as less desirable than a deferred tax liability since deferred tax liabilities result in lower taxable
income in the current period, whereas deferred tax assets result in higher taxable income and higher
taxes due in the current period. It is in general more desirable to delay paying taxes. In our previous
research (Wang et al., 2016), we documented that publicly listed Chinese companies’ median
GAAP effective income tax rate is 13% while the median cash effective income tax rate is 26%.
This is less than optimal from a cash flow management standpoint. Many factors contribute to this
result. In this research, we investigate the incentives of companies reporting impairment loss, and
thus creating deferred tax assets, which lower accounting net income but typically do not lower
taxable income.
The goal of this study is to analyze how compensation and insider equity holdings affect
impairment loss taking. Our process will include examination of many variables that could impact
impairment loss decisions, including firm market value and size, compensation of and ownership
percentages of various management groups, Board of Director and Board of Supervisor size and
composition, asset mix, leverage and industry. We include all companies listed on the Shenzhen
and Shanghai stock exchanges for the period 2011-2016. Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8
(CAS No. 8) prohibits the reversal of long-lived asset impairments to constrain managerial
opportunism with respect to previously recognized impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids
the reversal of long-lived asset impairment losses only, while allowing the reversal of short-term
asset impairment losses. Our analysis shows the influence of this differential treatment on firm
impairment loss taking behavior.
Literature Review
It has long been understood that firms have a certain amount of latitude in the application of
accounting rules, and that they use that latitude to measure reported earnings. Healy & Wahlen
(1999) find that earnings management is used “to window dress financial statements prior to public
securities offerings, to increase corporate managers’ compensation and job security, to avoid
violating lending contracts, or to reduce regulatory costs or to increase regulatory benefits.”
Numerous studies have concluded that the accounting for asset impairment provides management
with the flexibility to exercise judgment in the reporting of impairment losses (Riedl 2004; Titard
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& Pariser, 1996; Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Francis, Hanna & Vincent (1996) find that an
announcement of an impairment loss communicates information regarding a decline in the
economic value of assets. In a study of 55 Taiwan firms, Duh, Lee, & Lin (2009) find that firms
that recognize more impairment losses are more likely to reverse the loss in subsequent periods in
order to avoid earnings decline, and this is more pronounced in firms with higher debt ratios.
Shaari, Cao & Donnelly (2017) study the effects of IAS No. 36 which allows impairment loss
reversal and find that for firms that reverse impairments, there are no increase in incentives to
engage in earnings management, nor are there in fact an increase in earnings management. In
addition, they find a positive association between reversals and stock valuation changes, but no
association with future operating performance. Duh, Lee & Lin (2009) study 110 listed firms in
Taiwan during the period from 2005 through the first quarter of 2007 to determine whether
impairment loss reversals provide an opportunity for earnings management and whether reversals
are associated with managers’ incentives. They find that firms that recognize more impairment
losses are more likely to reverse impairments when doing so avoids a decline in earnings. They do
not find firms with higher earnings-based compensation for top managers being more likely to
reverse impairments. The adoption of SFAS No. 142, eliminating goodwill amortization and
instead requiring an annual assessment of goodwill impairment, has motivated research into this
issue. Jordan & Clark (2004) examine Fortune 100 companies that reported goodwill impairments.
They find that firms taking goodwill impairments possess lower earnings than other companies
that did not record a write-down, suggesting that these firms adopt a ‘‘big bath’’ strategy. Sevin &
Schroeder (2005) conclude that some firms have used this assessment of goodwill impairment in
a “big bath” strategy.
Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8) prohibits the reversal of long-lived asset
impairments to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized
impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long-lived asset impairment losses
only, while allowing the reversal of short-term asset impairment losses. Zhou & Habib (2013) cite
previous research, which documents that managers use impairment losses strategically to manage
company earnings. They find that managers use less current asset write-downs and more reversals
in the post CAS No. 8 period, but that these practices do not seem to be motivated by the desire to
avoid losses or to report “big bath” losses. The international standard IAS No. 36 allows for the
reversal of impairment losses on long-term assets if the asset value recovers. Zhang, Lu, & Ye
(2010) investigate the impact of transitioning away from IAS No. 36 to a standard that prohibits
impairment reversals on long-term assets. They find an increase in impairments, followed by loss
reversals, but are unable to document any evidence of earnings management.
How impairment loss affects stock price is beyond the scope of this study, but it forms an important
stream of research. Hsieh & Wu (2005) investigate factors affecting the timing and amount of asset
impairment and find that those factors include both reporting and operational motives. In addition,
they note a significant negative stock price reaction to impairment announcements. In a study of
Australian firms, Sharpe & Walker (1975) conclude that an impairment revaluation is associated
with an increased stock price. But in a similar study using New Zealand firms, Emanuel (1989)
finds no association between revaluation announcements and share prices. Aboody et al. (1999)
undertake a similar study using UK firms. They document that upward revaluations by UK firms
are significantly and positively related to future firm performance. They also conclude that
revaluations are related to stock returns, indicating that revaluations reflect asset value changes.
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How equity-based compensation affects firm performance and management behavior has long
been under discussion. Armstrong, Jagolinzer & Larcker (2010) use a sample of nearly 20,000
CEO incentives for fiscal years 2001 – 2005 to examine whether equity-based compensation
provides incentive to CEOs to manipulate accounting data. In contrast to some other studies, they
do not find evidence that equity incentives are related to accounting irregularities. In fact, they find
some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms at which top executives
have relatively high equity-based compensation packages. However, Elayan, Li & Meyer (2008)
find that the compensation of top executives at firms that had accounting irregularities are
significantly more weighted toward equity-based compensation. They find that the average
irregularity represents 363.5% of the firms’ average net income and are predominantly
overstatements of revenue, income or net income, early recognition of income, phantom sales, or
overstatement of assets. Cohen, Dey & Lys (2005) note an increase in earnings management during
the period 1997 – 2002, and find that stock-based compensation and options are a strong predictor
of aggressive accounting. Harris & Bromiley (2007) use data from the GAO on financial statement
restatements by US firms from January 1997 to June 2002 to study the factors that encourage firms
to misrepresent their financial statements. They find two factors that substantially increase the
likelihood of misrepresentation: a high level of CEO compensation in the form of stock options
and very low firm performance compared to other firms in the industry. They also report that
financial incentives for top executives have grown radically from 1990, when top executives
earned an average of 100 times the pay of a typical worker, to 2003 when various researchers give
the percentage as 350 to 570 times the pay of a typical worker. Harris & Bromiley (2007) also find
an 8.77% probability of misrepresentation by any specific firm over a 5-year period, which is a bit
less that the GAO estimate of 9.9%
In an investigation of the relationship between impairment losses and CEO compensation,
Darrough, Guler & Wang (2014) examine whether CEO compensation is reduced when goodwill
impairment losses are recognized. They find a significant reduction in CEO compensation as firms
recognize goodwill impairment losses. Their results suggest that CEOs pay a price for non-value
maximizing acquisitions. Beatty & Weber (2006) find that the existence of a bonus plan affects
the timing of the goodwill impairment charge required under SFAS 142. However, Darrough,
Guler & Wang (2014) and Beatty & Weber (2006)’s efforts to link compensation with impairment
are limited to goodwill impairment. Duh, Lee & Lin (2009) examine impairment reversal and
earnings-based compensation. Our study is an in depth comprehensive analysis of impairment loss
and compensation. Our analysis shows how cash and equity-based compensation can affect
impairment loss in opposite ways.
Methodology
Data Collection
The data used in our study is are from China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database
(CSMAR), which includes all companies listed on the Shenzhen and Shanghai stock exchanges.
The data range is from 2011-2016.
Hypothesis Development
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Trottier (2013) finds that permitting impairment loss reversals signiﬁcantly increases the
likelihood that a manager would record an impairment. This is caused not by the manager’s
intention to smooth income by impairment reversals, but by his desire to avoid the potential loss
of a future bonus, which would be jeopardized if he could not reverse previously recorded
impairment losses should asset value recover in the future. Darrough, Guler & Wang (2014) study
the impact on CEO compensation when impairment losses are recognized on acquired business
units. They find that firms reduced CEO total compensation after recognition of goodwill
impairment losses. However, while levels of cash (salary and bonus) and stock options were
significantly reduced, restricted stock compensation was not reduced significantly. This is thought
to be because restricted stock compensation is a less risk-inducing form of compensation than cash
and stock option compensation. An examination of the relationship between CEO compensation
and accounting choice by Beatty & Weber (2006) centers on accounting choices that managers
made during the transition to SFAS 142. They find that if there was a bonus plan that relied on
earnings, goodwill impairment charges were less likely to be recorded and tended to be lower in
magnitude. They find that compensation committees incorporated adverse effects of asset writedowns or goodwill impairment charges in compensation formulas.
Previous studies seem to support that incentive-based compensation can discourage impairment
loss recognition. We believe impairment loss in the current year improves the firm’s income
outlook in the following year and potentially allows for a bigger raise for the executives. However,
based on the results from previous studies, we separately analyze cash and incentive-based
compensations.
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between impairment loss recognition and the
following year’s executive cash pay growth.
Fernandes et al. (2016) conclude that the probability of recognition of impairment losses is higher
for companies with higher market values. Elliott and Shaw (1988) find significant differences in
the reporting of impairment losses between large and small entities. In an examination of a number
of explanatory variables, Yanamoto (2008) concludes that the probability of impairment
recognition increases with asset value. Studies by Li et al. (2011) and Oliveira et al. (2010) find
positive relationships between total assets, net profits (factors affecting market value), and
impairment reporting. We believe larger firms are more likely to recognize impairment loss. We
use the natural logs of market value and sales as the proxy for firm size.
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between impairment loss recognition and the
size of the company.
Cornett, Marcus, & Tehranian (2008) investigate whether the impact of governance structure and
incentive-based compensation on firm performance continues when performance is adjusted for
earnings management. Overall, they find that when earnings management is adjusted for, there is
a substantial increase in the importance of governance variables, and a decrease in the impact of
incentive compensation on overall corporate performance. A number of studies (Bergstresser &
Philippon, 2006; Cohen, Dey, & Lys 2005; Cheng & Warfield, 2005) investigate the relationship
between discretionary accruals and earnings management, and conclude that the magnitude of
discretionary accruals is greater and there is a higher incidence of earnings management at firms
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where manager wealth is closely tied to stock value. On the contrary, Warfield, Wild, & Wild
(1995) find that a high level of managerial ownership is positively related to the explanatory power
of reported earnings and accruals management is inversely related to managerial ownership. As
we presented earlier, Darrough, Guler & Wang (2014) and Beatty & Weber (2006) conclude that
goodwill impairment recognition is discouraged by incentive-based compensations.
In this study, we want to determine whether management compensation, especially incentive based
compensation, affects impairment recognition. Previous studies as we analyzed above are
inconclusive. Incentive based compensation is often based on firm performance. Impairment loss
taking negatively affects firm performance. We thus hypothesize a negative association between
incentive-based compensation and impairment recognition. We do not have direct information on
incentive-based compensation. We are able to obtain executives, management, BOD and BOS
members’ security holdings percentages of the total outstanding stock. The percentages are used
as proxies of incentive-based compensation. We exclude management and BOD members’
ownerships from our analysis due to multicollinearity considerations.
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative association between impairment loss recognition and
insider equity holding.
Model 1: Impairment= β0 + β1MarketValue+β2 ExecutivePayGrowth(t+1) + β3 BODPayGrowth(t+1)
+ β4StateOwnership% + β5ExecutiveOwnership% + β6BOSOwnership%+β7BODSize+
β8IndependentBOD%+ β9BOSSize+ β10Financial + β11Utilities + β12RealEstate +
β13Wholesale&Retail + β14Size + β15AssetMix + β16Leverage + β17PreviousYearLoss +ε
Where:
Impairment is the natural log of impairment loss if impairment loss is taken, 0 otherwise.
MarketValue is the natural log of the total market value of the company.
ExecutivePayGrowth(t+1) is the top three executives’ pay growth in the year following
impairment loss.
BODPayGrowth(t+1) is the top three Board of Directors’ pay growth in the year following
impairment loss.
StateOwnership% is the state ownership percentage of the company.
ExecutiveOwnership% is executives’ ownership percentage of the company.
BOSOwnership% is Board of Supervisors’ ownership percentage of the company.
BODSize is Board of Directors’ size scaled by the natural log of sales.
IndependentBOD% is the percentage of independent BOD members.
BOSSize is Board of Supervisors size scaled by the natural log of sales.
Finanical, Utilities, RealEstate, and Wholesale&Retail are different industries. The baseline
industries are manufacturing and complex industries.
Size is the natural log of sales.
AssetMix is capital assets scaled by total assets.
Leverage is beginning total debt divided by beginning total assets
PreviousYearLoss is 1 if previous year has a loss, 0 otherwise.
Chinese Accounting Standard No. 8 (CAS No. 8) prohibits the reversal of long-lived asset
impairments to constrain managerial opportunism with respect to previously recognized
impairment loss reversal. CAS No. 8 forbids the reversal of long-lived asset impairment losses
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only, while allowing the reversal of short-term asset impairment losses. Since some impairment
losses can be reversed in later years, data is separated into two groups for the purpose of
analysis. Companies with reversed impairment losses are separately analyzed.
Results
Table 1: Descriptive statistics

MarketValue
ExecutivePayGrowth(t+1)
BODPayGrowth(t+1)
StateOwnership%
ExecutiveOwnership%
ManagementOwnership%
BODOwnership%
BOSOwnership%
Sales
AssetMix
Leverage

Companies with impairment
loss
Mean
Median
6,560,269,386 3,579,476,324
0.1699
0.0474
0.1919
0.0474
0.0433
0.0000
0.0846
0.0012
0.1590
0.0076
0.1495
0.0045
0.0043
0.0000
8,292,121,671 1,411,001,107
0.4104
0.3936
0.4428
0.3910

Companies reversed
impairment loss
Mean
Median
6,350,344,781 3,165,031,826
0.1823
0.0520
0.2579
0.0396
0.0565
0.0000
0.0554
0.0000
0.1066
0.0001
0.1011
0.0001
0.0026
0.0000
4,431,707,651 1,245,554,238
0.4569
0.4488
0.5713
0.4163

Companies without impairment
loss
Mean
Median
11,476,970,038 3,616,335,749
0.3003
0.0440
0.0902
0.0376
0.0758
0.0000
0.0377
0.0000
0.0397
0.0000
0.0365
0.0000
0.0014
0.0000
4,912,281,653 1,797,185,026
0.5567
0.7120
0.4612
0.4737

Market value and sales are in RMB.
The item that catches our attention is asset mix. While companies with impairment loss only have
39% in capital assets, companies without impairment loss have 71% in capital assets. Thus,
companies with a high percentage of long-lived assets are much less likely to record impairment
losses. We speculate that this may be because CAS No. 8 prohibits reversal of impairment losses
on long-lived assets. Companies with high percentages of capital assets are reluctant to take
impairment losses on their capital assets and have fewer short-term assets that may be subject to
impairment.
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Table 2: Companies with impairment loss vs. companies without
Overall model: p<0.0001; Adjusted R2=0.3188
Parameter Estimates
Variable
Parameter Standard t Value
Estimate
Error -0.76
-0.4087
0.5362
Intercept
MarketValue
0.0419
0.0233
1.80
ExecutivePayGrowth(t+1)
0.0277
0.0095
2.93
BODPayGrowth(t+1)
-0.0039
0.0109 -0.36
StateOwnership%
-0.3963
0.1673 -2.37
ExecutiveOwnership%
-0.3814
0.1583 -2.41
BOSOwnership%
-3.7139
1.4254 -2.61
BODSize
1.0261
0.3254
3.15
IndependentBOD%
1.8969
0.4463
4.25
BOSSize
0.5924
0.4558
1.30
Financial
1.5051
0.1555
9.68
Utilities
-0.3979
0.0597 -6.67
RealEstate
-0.4343
0.1026 -4.23
Wholesale&Retail
-1.1199
0.1058 -10.59
Size
0.6954
0.0172 40.53
AssetMix
-0.8493
0.1089 -7.80
Leverage
0.1225
0.0271
4.52
PreviousYearLoss
1.3280
0.0963 13.79

Pr > |t| Variance
0.4459 Inflation
0
0.0717 1.4032
0.0034 1.0099
0.7226 1.0126
0.0178 1.0741
0.0160 1.2212
0.0092 1.0685
0.0016 1.4699
<.0001 1.2949
0.1937 1.2585
<.0001 1.2851
<.0001 1.0828
<.0001 1.0860
<.0001 1.0522
<.0001 1.5066
<.0001 1.1850
<.0001 1.0456
<.0001 1.0789

* Impairment is the natural log of impairment loss if impairment loss is taken, 0 otherwise.
The results in Table 2 for executive cash pay (ExecutivePayGrowth) do suggest that executives
get bigger raises in the following year if bigger impairment losses are taken. We believe higher
executive cash pay growth in the future is a motivating factor for impairment loss taking behavior.
BOD members pay raises are not associated with impairment loss. Insider security holding does
affect impairment loss taking significantly. Although executive pay raises in the following year
encourage impairment loss taking, executive security ownership discourages impairment loss
taking. BOS members’ security ownership also significantly reduces impairment losses. Increases
in BOD size and the percentage of independent BOD members significantly increases impairment
loss taking while state ownership significantly decreases it. We do not have strong support to
validate that firms with higher market values are more likely to take impairment losses. However,
bigger firms are significantly more likely to recognize impairment loss if firm size is measured by
sales instead of market value. Other factors that affect impairment loss taking are industry, asset
mix, leverage, and previous year loss. The industry that is most likely to take impairment losses is
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the financial industry. We wonder if this is related to bad debt write-offs. A breakdown of
impairment loss in the financial industry would reveal more information, however this is beyond
the scope of this paper. The base industries are manufacturing and complex industries. Firms with
higher debt, and with previous year losses are all more likely to take an impairment loss. We note
that firms with higher capital concentration are less likely to take impairment loss. As mentioned
previously, we speculate that this may be because CAS No. 8 prohibits reversal of impairment
losses on long-lived assets. Companies with high percentages of capital assets are reluctant to take
impairment losses on their capital assets and have fewer short-term assets that may be subject to
impairment.
Executive compensation structure significantly affects impairment loss taking. Security based
compensation lowers impairment loss taking, while cash compensation encourages impairment
loss taking. BOD members’ compensation does not affect impairment loss taking while BOS
members’ security based compensation significantly lowers impairment loss. Bigger firms,
judging by sales instead of market value, are more likely to take impairment loss. Our results
support hypothesis 1 and partially support hypothesis 2 and 3.
Table 3: Parameter estimates when impairment loss is reversed (negative)
Overall model: p<0.0001; Adjusted R2=0.1065
Parameter Estimates
Variable
Parameter Standard t Value Pr > |t| Variance
Estimate
Error
5.0056
1.8380
2.72 0.0066 Inflation
0
Intercept
MarketValue
0.0531
0.0792
0.67 0.5032 1.5031
ExecutivePayGrowth(t+1)
-0.1243
0.1492 -0.83 0.4050 1.3154
BODPayGrowth(t+1)
-0.0248
0.0701 -0.35 0.7233 1.3135
StateOwnership%
-0.4411
0.4834 -0.91 0.3618 1.0784
ExecutiveOwnership%
-1.3899
0.6637 -2.09 0.0366 1.2273
BOSOwnership%
-13.2687
7.0616 -1.88 0.0606 1.1048
BODSize
0.0416
1.1042
0.04 0.9700 1.5400
IndependentBOD%
0.6239
1.6941
0.37 0.7128 1.3052
BOSSize
1.0335
1.4744
0.70 0.4836 1.3277
Financial
0.5064
0.6342
0.80 0.4248 1.2359
Utilities
-0.1401
0.1926 -0.73 0.4672 1.1765
RealEstate
0.4383
0.2708
1.62 0.1059 1.2198
Wholesale&Retail
-0.4492
0.3000 -1.50 0.1348 1.1042
Size
0.3786
0.0584
6.48 <.0001 1.6392
AssetMix
-0.4746
0.3445 -1.38 0.1688 1.3305
Leverage
-0.0965
0.0668 -1.45 0.1486 1.0943
PreviousYearLoss
0.9323
0.2809
3.32 0.0009 1.1433
*Dependent variable is the natural log of the absolute value of impairment loss reversal.
9
Published by Digital Commons @ Southern University and A&M College, 2022

9

Southern University College of Business E-Journal, Vol. 13 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 1

Table 3 provides information on impairment losses taken by companies that later reverse the
impairment recognition. Only three items have an impact on impairment revaluation. Executive
security ownership has a negative impact and both firm size and previous year loss have a positive
impact. Executive incentive compensation discourages both impairment loss recognition and
reversal. While bigger firms measured by sales are more likely to recognize impairment losses,
they are more likely to reverse the recognitions as well. Firms with previous year losses are more
likely to recognize impairment losses and are also more likely to reverse the recognitions.
Summary
Our results show that there is a positive association between impairment loss recognition and the
following year’s executive cash pay growth, and that there is a negative association between
impairment loss recognition and insider equity holding. While executive incentive compensation
discourages impairment recognition, it also discourages reversal of the recognition. There is a
positive association between impairment loss recognition and the size of the company, if size is
measured by sales instead of market value. While bigger firms (measured by sales) and firms with
previous year losses are more likely to recognize impairment losses, they are more likely to reverse
the recognitions as well. Furthermore, a bigger BOD size and a higher percentage of independent
BOD members in the board encourage impairment recognition.
Our results shed light on how corporate compensation structure and corporate supervision
mechanisms affect company earnings management behavior, specifically in regard to impairment
recognition and revaluation. We believe balanced executive cash and incentive compensation
accompanied by a larger BOD and a larger percentage of independent BOD members in the BOD
promote proper impairment recognition and revaluation.
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